.. 'Then a pair of objects is presented for comparison and the t"vo are placed in the relationship preferred: not-preferred, we have what is kno)m as a paired comparison. A set of n objects can be compared, a pair at a time, in some or all of the possible n(n -1)/2 vmys of choosing a pair, and the set of paired comparisons so derived gives us a picture of the interrelationships of the objects under preference. A paired-comparison scheme is more general than a ranking; for with the latter A-preferred-to-l3 and B-preferred-to-C automatically ensures A-preferred-to-C, whereas Tlith paired comparisons it might happen that C was preferred to A. The existence of these departures from~he ranking situation may be due to various reasons, such as the fact that 'preference' is a complicated comparison being made
• ydth reference to several factors simultaneously; and one reason for using paired comparisons is to give such effects a chance to show themselves.
2.
Situations often occur in which a set of m observers express preferences among n objects and we have to se~ect that object, or perhaps .
. that sub-set of objects, vThioh are, in some sense, "most preferred. ', 1dlen we have to select a subset of the n objects as "elected" we shall in general, in the absence of . complete unanimity, violate a number of preferences. Ciroumstances force us to do so to some extent. The problem is to do so to the least possible extent.
3.
Consider the ease in '\1hich 8 members of a body have to elect a committee of three from among themselves. We will suppose that no member votes for himself (thoueh this makes no essential difi'erence) and that there are no abstentions (though this too makes no essential difference). If the Here" for the moment, we suppose that there is no preference expressed among the triplets of members preferred; that is to say, A prefers B"D,E but does Notice that: (a) the sum of row and column totals for eaoh letter is 18. This provides a oheok. The rNSOD is that eaoh of the letters is compared with three others by each of aix observers, so that each letter has 18 preferenoes (one way or the other).
(b) each column or row total is a multiple of three; for if al etter is preferred at all by an observer it is preferred to three others.
4.
From the array (2) ' ;;. The procedure we have followed exhibits the structure of the preference scheme most clearly, but for the purposes of electing a committee of three we can proceed much more expeditiously. In fact, from array (1) we see that the voting is as follows:
• -s- 
We suppose that these are in order. Member C has overstepped the mark.
Unless we reject his ballot as spoiled we delete D from his ordering.
Member B prefers C to A and both to the other four, but cannot express a preference between those other four and hence submits only two names. Member G tries to "plW1'Ip" but we disallow this and count his expression as a preference for B only. He noV{ have the preferences in the third column of (5) For example, if in (5) member D tied C, S, E there would be two fewer preferences for C and one fewer preference for B in (6).
(e) In particular this met·hod covers the case when each of a set of judges ranks all the objects, and not merely a preferred sub-set of them.
The 1'1hole method, in fact, is very fiexible in this respect. So long as any preferences are expressed vm can pursue the same technique. The only thing to take particular care about is that one judge has the same opportunities as another for expressing the same number of preferences, even though he may not avail himself of them, Ue clearly introduce bias if we give one judge a chance to express two prefarences and another only one. The system proposed is in accordance with the best democratic principles in that each judge has the same number of votes, and all votes have the same weight.
(f) It is possible to order the members, according to the number of preferences allotted to them, in a ranking (which may itself contain tied members). Thus we constrain a paired-comparison system into a ranking at the expense of violating a number of preferences. The fewer the violations the nearer the scheme to an actual ranking. In tables of the type of (2) or (4) a perfect and unanimous ranldng would correspond to a situation in which all the non-zero cells were above the main diaGonal. We recalculate a score for each player by giving him the score of every player he has beaten and half the score of every player with 'whom he has drawn. This leads to th.e following new scores:
A '" !.(4 !) + 21
.. 14 !. He nmv arrange the players in order of nevi scores; and we now notice that A and C have separated" A being first and C second" while D has moved up to equality with D, E" and F.
This is as far as one would wish to go on practical grounds, perhaps, but nOYI a further point raises i tsel!. \7e have re-allocated the scores once.
v~not do so again? If we re-allocate the scores of (0) The order is now the same as we derived from (9); and if we ascertain new scores on the same principle \1e shall find that no new ordering has appeared.
Later I shall prove that after a time the situation always "settles down" in this way.
13.
There are two interesting features of this procedure. Let us revert to the preference scheme of (7) by the matrix (7) and add roV( totals we shall get the scores of (9); and so on. The continual reallocation of scores is equivalent to taking successive powers of the matrix.
14.
Let us now consider 'what interpretation can be given to the process in terms of compa:dsonA. The fol1Oldng~iagram B~t.h~scheme 01' (7) in geomet.rlcal form
The six players are represented by the six vertices of a regular hexagon, vnuch are joined by straight lines in all pOflsib1e ways. If A pref. B we draw an arrow from A towards B. If no preference was expressed (or the game was drawn) we do not draw an arrow.
15. It will be seen that the score of any player in (7) There are ten of these "transitive" preferences. We also count the preference of B with itself, C with itself, etc., as 1/2 each, maldng a further score of 2; aM finally we score 1/2 of 1/2 for the double preference of A with itself'. The total score is 14 t ' which is the score for A in (11). It may be verified that the same procedure gives the other scores in that array. 
17.
Or we may put it another way by saying that 17e compare two members AD not directly, but through their comparisons nith other members, e.g. by ACB, l:.DB, AED and AFB. We choose the leading members in the final order so as to maximize the agreement with transitive preferences; or conversely, so as to minimize the violation of transitive preferences. Whether this is the right thing to do depends to some extent on practical circumstances. The process of continual reallocation has the advantage that it results in an objective final ordering; but whether this is v,hat we want depends on whether we are considering a situation in vmich direct comparison is the basic generator of the data, or whether we wish to give scope for more renecti.ve judgment in roundabout comparisons involving other members.
18.
Let us now consider the case when several judGes make ?aired camparisons, or several tournaments are played between the same set of players.
For each observer ue shall have a preference matrix of the type of (7), To .
obtain a composite picture, on the supposition that the judges are equally reliable, we superpose the matrices. Thus if (7) represents the preferences of a judge for 6 varieties of ice cream when offered to him in pairs, two additional judges might have the fo11mving preference matrices: If a preference matrix of type (15) is divisible in this sense the members of one block of objects are alvmys preferred to every member of another. In such a case we divide the data into the two blocks and operate on eaCh, finally ranking the members of the first group and then the members of the second. Similarly, i f one of these blocks is~.tsalf divisible we divide it up; and so on. V1e clearly lose no generality by doinc this, and diVisibility is not a handicap in our preference situations. It is now easy to show that for a~positive integer k (19) As the ponerinc proceeds the major root Al becomes dominant and (19) tends to the equation (20) Thus from some k onwards the final ordering will be determined by the vector \ ' which has non-negative elements.
22.
Vfe notice that the proof remains applicable to preference matrices in ",hich some preferences may be missine;, or when 'ties are present, provided that the matrix is not divisible. If any cell in a combined 'Pl'efer- ence matrix contains no entries we insert a zero.
-20-
23.
It is also of some interest to note that lYe may prove that the preference matrix is never singular. In fact, we can always express it (apart from positive numerical factors) in the form
where Q is an anti-s;ymmetric matrix and U is the matrix all of YThose elements are unity. For example (15), after division of rows by 1 1/2, can be expressed as U plus the matrix 
We reduce Q + U systematically by subtracting the first column from the second column, then the first row from the second row; then the first column from the third column, then the first row' from the third row; and so on. The effect on Q is to reduce it to another antisymmetric matrix, say Q', and the effect on U is to reduce it to a unit in the top left-hand corner and zero else'\1here. Thus the determinant of Q + U is the determinant of Q' plus the determinant of the principal minor obtained by omitting the first rO"ii/' and colwnn, which is also ant.i.symmetric.
How the determinant of p x p antisynunetric matrix is zero if p is odd and positive i f p is even. Hence the determinant of Q + U is the sum.
of two components, one zero and the other positive; and hence it does not vanish.
22.
In practice the number of paired comparisons arising from n objects may be inconveniently large and the question arises whether it is possible to economize in the number of comparisons made. In the example of the chess tournament v/hich has been mentioned above (paragraph 10) i f each player is to play every other, 15 games must be played. But only three can be con- 
24.
Consider first of all the case of a single observer. Of the n(n -1)/2 preferences which he could make we require to pick out a sub-set.
Certain elementary principles of choice at once suggest themselves:
(a) every object should appear equally often. In this sense the design should be balanced;
(b) the preferences should not be divi8ible in the sense that we can split the objects into two sets and no cauparison is made between any object in one and an;r object in the other.
In terms of preference matrices ( 
29.
The setting up of incomplete designs is most easily thought of in terms of tours round the preference polygon. Consider the case n =7. 
32.
I do not propose on this occasion to attempt a systematic exposition of the design problems involved in paired comparisons. Designs of an optimum kind which balance by numbers of comparisons, objects compared, numbers of observers on given comparisons and so forth are probably rather rare; and if something has to be sacrificed it depends on rrhat is the point of major interest whether 1"1e sacrifice symmetry in comparisons or in judges.
A final exaruple vdll Llake clear a fevt of the principles involved.
Consider aeain the case of seven objects, ABC D E F G. With these schemes every comparison is made equally often (twice)} every tour is made equally often (twice); every observer makes the same number of comparisons (14); every observer has a tour in common with every other observer; and thus every observer can be oompared with every other observer in respect of two comparisons involving any specified object.
If we have more than three observers, we take a number equal to a multiple of three and replicate the design.
HoYT suppose 1I'e had eleven objects, A to IC. The full set of compari- 
Now if lve try to allot two tours to each of five observers we lose symmetr;r;
for there are 10 pairs of tours choosab1.e .from these five. We have, to preserve complete balance, to allot four tours to each observer 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
Again the tours are balanced, but ,ve have not achieved very much. Each observer now makes 44 comparisons, against the full set of 55.
rfe can sacrifice symmetry in several ways. \'fe may, for instance, allot two tours to each observer, e.g. 
Here every observer can be compared with tyro other observers but not every pair can be compared. Or if we have, say, 10 observers liTe may allot all the 10 possible pairs of tours one to each. Each observer then makes 22 comparisons and can be compared with four other observers. If 22 comparisons are still felt to be too many for one observer we may allocate the 55 preferences according to a linked design, e.g. (numbering the preferences 1 to 55)~dth 11 observers, 10 preferences each
